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ABSTRACT
Defined Benefit and Defined Contribution plans havesignificantly different
characteristics with respect to the risks faced by employers andemployees, the
sensitivity of benefits to inflation, the flexibility of funding, and theimpor-
tance of governmental supervision. In this paper, we examinesome of the main
tradeoffs involved in the choice between 08 and DC plans. Ourmost general
conclusion is that neither plan type can be said to wholly dominatethe other from
the perspective of employee welfare.
The major advantage of DB plans is the potential they offerto provide a
stable replacement rate of final income to workers. If thereplacement rate is
the relevant variable for worker retirement utility, then DBplans offer some
degree of insurance against real wage risk. Of course, protection offeredto
workers is risk borne by the firm. As realwages change, funding rates must
correspondingly adjust. However, to the extent that real wage risk is largely
diversifiable to employers, and nondiversifiable to employees, thereplacement
rate stability should be viewed as an advantage of DB plans.
The advantages of DC plans are most apparent duringperiods of inflation
uncertainty. These are: the predictability of the value of pension wealth, the
3bility to invest in inflation-hedged portfolios rather than nominal OBannuities,
and the fully-funded nature of the DC plan. Finally, the DCplan has the advan-
tage that workers can more easily determine the true present value of thepension
benefit they earn in any year, although theymay have more incertainty about
future pension-benefit flows at retirement. Measuring thepresent value of
accruing defined benefits is difficult at best and imposes severe informational
requirements on workers. Such difficulties could lead workers to misvalue their
total compensation, and result in misinformed behavior.
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Although employerpension programs vary in design they are usually
classified into two broad types: defined contribution and defined benefit.
These two categories are distinguished in the law under ERISA. Under a
defined contribution (DC) plan each employee has an account into which the
employer and, if it is a contributory plan, the employee make regular
contributions. Benefit levels depend on the total contributions and
investment earnings of the accumulation in the account. Often the employee
has some choice regarding the type of assets in which his accumulation is
invested and can easily find out what its value is at any point in his working
career. Defined contribution plans are in effect tax—deferred savings
accounts in trust for the employees, and are by definition fully funded. They
are therefore not of much concern to government regulators and are notcovered
byPension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBCG) insurance.
In a defined benefit (DB) plan the employee's pension benefit entitlement
is determined by a formula which takes into account years of service for the
employer and, in most cases, wage or salary. Many defined benefit formulas
also take Into account the Social Security benefits to which an employee is
entitled. These are the so—called "integrated" plans. See Merton, Bodie and
Marcus (1984) for a discussion of integration.
DB and DC plans have significantly different characteristics with respect
to the risks faced by employers and employees, the sensitivity of benefits to
inflation, the flexibility of funding, and the importance of governmental
supervision. Our objective in this paper is to examine the tradeoffs involved
in the choice between DB and DC plans.In the next section, we briefly review the mechanics governing the
determination and valuation of the benefit streams under DB and DC pension
plans. Section 3 contains an informal discussion of the relative advantages
of each type of plan. In section 4 we develop a formal model to examine the
tradeoffs between the two types of plans in the face of both wage and interest
rate uncertainty. Our conclusion there is that neither plan can be said to
wholly dominate the other from the perspective of employee welfare. The final
section summarizes our results and concludes the paper.
II. PLAN CHARACTERISTICS AND VALUATION
A. DC Plans
The DC arrangement is the conceptually simpler retirement plan. The
employer, and sometimes also the employee, make regular contributions Into the
employee's retirement account. The contributions are usually specified as a
predetermined fraction of salary, although that fraction need not be constant
over the course of a career.'
Contributions from both parties are tax—deductible,2 and investment
income accrues tax—free. Often the employee is given a choice as to how his
account is to be invested. In principle, contributions maybeInvested in any
security, although In practice most plans limit investment options to various
bond, stock and money—market funds. At retirement, the employee either
receives a lump sum or an annuity, the size of which depends upon the
accumulated value of the funds in the retirement account. The employee thus
bears all of the investment risk; the retirement account is by definition
fully funded, and the firm has no obligation beyond making its periodic
contribution.
—2—Valuation of the DC plan is straightforward:simply measure the market
value of the assets held in the retirement account.However, as a guide for
personal financial planning, the DC plan sponsor often provides workerswith
the indicated size of a life annuitystarting at retirement age that could be
purchased now with the accumulation in their account under different
scenarios. The actual size of the retirement annuitywill, of course, depend
upon the realized investment performance of the retirement fund, the interest
rate at retirement, and the ultimate wage path of theemployee.
B. DB Plans
Whereas the DC framework focuses on the value of theassets currently
endowing a retirement account, the DB plan focuses on the flow of benefits
which the individual will receiveupon retirement.
A typical DB plan determines the employee's benefitas a function of both
years of service and wage history. As a representative plan, considerone in
which the employee receives 1 percent ofaverage salary (during the last 5
years of service) times the number of years of service. Normal retirementage
is 65, there are no early retirement options, deathor disability benefits and
no Social Security offset provisions. The actuariallyexpected life span at
retirement is 80 years.
Assuming the worker is fully vested, at any point in time his claim isa
deferred nominal life annuity, insuredup to certain limits by the Pension
Benefit Guarantee Corporation. It is a deferredannuity because the employee
cannot start receiving benefits until he reachesage 65. It is nominal
because the retirement benefit, which theemployer is contractually bound to
pay theemployee, is fixed in dollar amount at any pointin time up to and
includingretirement age.
—3—Many people think that under final average pay plans of the sort described
here, retirement benefits are implicitly indexed to inflation at least during
the employee's active years with the firm and therefore should not be viewed
as a purely nominal asset by the employee and a purely nominal liability by
the firm. We examine this issue in detail in Section III. For now we focus
on the value of the explicit claim only.
Given an Interest rate and a wage profile, it Is straightforward to
computethe present value of accrued benefits under our prototype DB plan.
Table 1presentssuch values forworkers at different ages assuming a constant
real annual wage of l5,OO0. The present value of accrued liabilities can
increase from continued service because of 3 factors: (1) as years of service
increase, so does the defined benefit, (2) if the wage increases, so will the
retirement benefit and (3) as time passes, less time remains until the
retirement benefits begin, so that their present value increases at the rate
of interest.
To illustrate the separate contributions of each of these factors to the
cumulative results reported in Table 1, consider the case in which the benefit
formula calls for 1% of final year's salary times years of service and that
the worker lives for 15 years after retiring at age 65. The worker is 35
years old, has worked for the firm 10 years and his current salary is
fl5,000. The nominal interest rate equals a real rate of 3% per year plus the
expectedrate of inflation.
Under the 7%inflation scenario, the sources of the change in the value of
the pen8ion benefit from the passage of an additional year are as follows.
Prior to this year, the worker had accrued a life annuity of $1,500 per year
(1% x 10 years x $15,000) beginning at age 65. With a nominal interest rate
—4—TABLE 1
PresentValue of Accrued Benefits and




Present Value of Accrued Benefits from
Accrued Benefits an Additional
in Constant Dollars Year's Work
0% Inflation7% Inflation0% Inflation7% Inflation
3% Discount 10% Discount3% Discount 10% Discount
Starting Age 25 Rate Rate Rate Rate
Current Age Constant% of Constant% of
DollarsSalary DollarsSalary
30 *2,274 *144 *455 3.03
35 *5,271 *463 *527 3.51 *82
.27
40 *9,167 *1,120 *611 4.07
.55
45 *14,169 *2,404 *708 4.72
1.05
50 *20,532 *4,840 *821 5.47 *546
1.98
55 *28,563 *9,354 *952 6.35 *938
3.64
60 *38,631 *17,575 *1,104
6.25





Assumes: Worker currently paid *15,000 peryear with no real wage growth.
Worker will retire at age 65.
Pension plan pays 1% of average salary in last fiveyears time years
of service.
Pension plan contains no early retirement provisions or makescorrect
actuarial adjustment for early retirees.
Benefits are vested after 5 years.
Real interest rate is 3%, nominal rate increases one forone with
Inflation.
Notes:*Indicates value calculated for age 64 rather thanage 65.
Source: Adapted from David T. Eliwood (1985).
—5—Factor (2):
—6--
of 10% per year, the present value (1W) of this deferred annuity at age 35 is
654. The increase in pension benefits as a result of working an additional
year can be broken into three parts:
Factor (1):One additional year of service at a salary of $16,050 (l5000x
1.07) entitles him to an additional deferred annuity of $160.50
per year, and
The salary increase of $1,050 entitles him to an additional
deferred annuity of $105 per year (1% x 10 years x $1,050).
The PV of these additional accrued benefits from factors (1) and (2) at the
end of the year is $127. This represents the nominal value of the newly
earned pension benefits, which is an annuity of $265.50 per year starting at
retirement.
Factor (3):The PV of his previously accrued benefits Increases by 10% from
$654 to $719.40 because the date of their eventual receipt has
drawn one year closer. As a result of all three factors the
nominal value of his pension wealth increases from $654 to $846
and its real value to $791.
Now let us refer to Table 1 to see how these factors manifest themselves
in the time pattern of benefit accrual in the no—inflation and in the 7%
inflation scenarios. The right—hand panel shows the constant dollar present
value of benefits attributable to continued work with the same employer; these
benefits are represented by factors (1) and (2) only. In the no—inflation
case, there is no salary growth and hence only factor (1) is at work. For
each additional year of service an additional deferred annuity of $150 per
year is earned. Note, however, that the value of the incremental benefits
earned at each age increases with age, from $455 (3.03% of salary) at age 30to $1,242 (8.28% of salary) at age 64. This is a reflection of the fact that
the additional $150 per year deferred life annuity has a higher PV the closer
the employee is to age 65. The accrual of benefits under a DB plan is thus
inherently "backloaded."
Thisbackloadingeffect is much more pronounced in the 7% inflation
scenario, because of the impact of inflation on the nominal interest rate,
holding the real interest rate fixed. In this case the constant—dollar value
of additional pension benefits earned increases from $41 (.27% of salary)at
age 30 to $2,794 (18.63% of salary) at age 64. In contrast, backloading or
frontloading in DC plans is Independent of inflation as well as interest
rates.3 This is becauseemployers can achieve any backloading pattern by
simply choosing an appropriate pattern of contribution rates over the course
of the employee's career. The left—hand panel of Table 1 illustrates the
effect of Inflation on the PV of total accumulated pension benefits under the
DE plan assuming no real salary growth.
C.Funding
As mentioned before, DC plans are by their nature fully—funded,i.e., the
market value of the plan's assets equals the liability of thesponsor to the
plan's beneficiaries. In sharp contrast, the calculation of the funding
status of DB plans is complex and controversial. If invested in traded
securities, the market value of the plan's assets Is relatively easy to
ascertain. The source of difficulty is In measuring the sponsor's liability.
From a strictly legal point of view the sponsor's liability is thepresent
value of the accrued vested benefits which would be payable If theplan were
immediately terminated. Butmanypension experts contend that sponsors have
—7—an implicit semi—contractual obligation which makes it more appropriate to
take account of projected future salary growth in the computation of the
firm's pension liability. The contention of a further obligation beyond the
legal one makes it unclear whether a real or nominal interest rate should be
used in discounting future benefits (either with or without salary growth
projections) to compute their present value. To evaluate the strict
obligation of the sponsor, the DB liabilities could be determined by deriving
the cost of an immunized or dedicated bond portfolio using current market
prices. While clearly superior to a simple interest rate assumption, this
valuation procedure is itself only an approximation because the payment dates
of pension liabilities typically extend far beyond the maturity range that is
rich enough to extract pure discount bond prices from traded coupon bonds.
Hence, an exact bond—dedication scheme is not feasible. Immunization
techniques that rely on duration measures are not wholly reliable because
duration measures are sensitive to the specification of term structure
dynamics. (See Bierwag (1977), Bierwag and Kaufman (1977), and Cox, Ingersoll
and Ross (1979).) Beyond the term structure, the default risk associated with
partially funded pension obligations adds the further problem of choosing
equivalent—risk bonds from the securities market.
For the past several years the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB)
has been grappling with these issues, trying to establish a uniform set of
valuation standards for firms to use in their financial statements.
The government guarantees, up to a limit, employer pension benefits
through the PBGC. The valuation of guaranteed benefits therefore should
utilize the riskless—in—terms—of—default interest rate. However, in practice,
only 80 percent of accrued benefits is vested while only 90—95 percent of
—8—vested benefits is guaranteed so that roughly one—quarter of accrued benefits
is not guaranteed (Ainoroso, 1982). Thus, the funding status of a plan is
important to employees as well as to the PBCG. In effect, adequate funding
protects accrued—but—not—yet—vested benefits. See Marcus (1984) for an
analysis of PBGC insurance and corporate funding policy.
III. TRADEOFFS
Our original belief was that defined contribution plans wouldnecessarily
dominate defined benefit plans because of the flexibility of DC plan design.
We would have guessed that anything that could be accomplished witha DB plan
could be replicated in a cleverly constructed DC plan. However, this belief
is not borne out. DB plans create implicit securities that canbewelfare
improving and which are not now available in capital markets, and which might
not be expected to be created in capital markets. Some examples of these
"securities" are factor—share claims, price—indexed claims, and perhaps
deferred life annuities at fair interest rates.
Moreover, some of the "real—world" complications in plan design such as
incentive effects tend to favor DB over DC plans. Thus, the optimal plan
design is likely to be firm specific. At this point, all we can do is
enumerate the relative advantages of each plan type, and describe the
circumstances in which one plan might dominate.
A. Investment Performance and Choice
The most obvious source of risk to an employee in the DC plan is the
investment performance of the fund. However, this source of uncertainty can
be controlled. For example, the periodic contributions of the DC plan could,
—9—in principle, be used to purchase deferred annuities which would generate
retirement income streams similar to those provided by DB plans.
Alternatively, it is feasible for the plan to select an investment strategy
with low variance rates of real returns. Bodie (1980) has shown that
commodity futures can be added to portfolios to successfully provide an
effective hedge against inflation. Therefore, in either nominal or real
terms, DC plans do not necessarily impose substantial risk on participants,
given the availability of low—variance investment strategies.
There are, however, no strong a priori reasons to believe that most
individuals would choose to invest accumulated DC funds in the lowest risk
asset. DC plans typically offer sufficient flexibility to select a
risk—return strategy suited to the employee's individual preferences and
circumstances. In contrast, DB plans force individuals to accumulate the
pension portion of retirement savings in the form of deferred life annuities,
and thus limit the risk—return choice.
B. Accrual Patterns
As noted and illustrated in Table 1, DB plans are inherently backloaded.
DC plans can be backloaded too by choosing a contribution rate thatriseswith
a worker's age and tenure.4 Therefore, the salient inherent difference in
accrual patterns between the two plan designs is that DB backloading is
stochastic in the sense that real benefit accruals depend upon the rate of
wage inflation. This seems to us an avoidable source of uncertainty which
both parties (employer and employee) might benefit by shedding. On this
score, DC plans would appear to be superior, although implicit contracting to
provide employees with a protective "wage floor" [cf. Diamond and Mirrlees
(1985)] can be implemented more effectively with DB—type plans.
—10—C. Termination and Portability
It is commonly asserted that considerations of portability favor DC
plans. The typical justification is that the worker in a DB plan who leaves
his job for reasons beyond his control forfeits future indexation of benefits
already accrued. It is further asserted that there are implicit contracts
between employees and firms which require larger total compensation (wageplus
pension accrual) for more highly tenured workers. Hence, termination of
employment causes a forfeiture of the ability to work for advantageous total
compensation rates (and, in particular, indexation of total pension
accruals). Under this line of reasoning, DC plans are more portable.
It should be realized, however, that the portability issue isintimately
tied to the accrual pattern. For DC plans with contribution rates tied to
tenure as well as age, the penalty to early termination can be asgreat as for
any DB plan. In practice, however, contribution rates for DC plans are rarely
tied to tenure, and are usually not as heavily backloaded as DRplans.
Therefore, in practice it would appear that portability considerations favor
DC plans over DB plans.
D. Incentives
Pension benefits in DC plans depend upon the wage trajectory over the
worker's entire career. In contrast, benefits in most DB plans dependon
final average salary. For this reason, workers in DB plans should havea
greater incentive to sustain a high level of effort over the entire career in
order to achieve a high career—end salary. Final salary hasgreater leverage
in DB plans because of its greater effect on pension benefits.
—11--In conclusion, it seems that there is a tradeoff between the goals of
portability and incentives. Portability dictates low backloading, while
incentives require high backloading. While DC plans opt in practice for lower
backloading than DB plans, this pattern is not an inherent property of the two
plans.
E. Informational Economies in Plan Design and Implementation
Retirement income planning is one of the most complex areas of personal
finance. Many employees would consider it a service to have their employer
define and provide an adequate level of savings for them. Since
retirement—income goals are typically defined as percentage replacement rates
of salary, the benefits of DB plans which are defined in exactly those terms
are easier to interpret.
One could in principle achieve the goal of a specific replacement rate
with a DC plan of the so—called "target benefit" type. Under these plans, the
contribution rate is adjusted periodically to achieve the target replacement
rate taking into account the discrepency between actual and assumed investment
return. However, such plans are rare.
F.Wage—Path Risk
The pegging of benefits in DB pians to final average wage wouldappear to
provide employees with a type of Income—maintenance Insurance not available in
DC plans. This observation has been used to support the selection of these
plans over DC plans. This conclusion is, however, not robust. If wage paths
are unpredictable at the start of a career, then individuals may view It as
very risky to have their retirement benefits depend so heavily on final
—12—salary. Indeed, employees might prefer a retirement benefit tied to
(inflation—adjusted) career—average earnings so as to eliminate excessive
dependence on the realized wage in the final years of employment. This
time—averaging feature is achieved by a DC plan because benefits will depend
on the contribution in each year of service, rather than on a final wage
formula. Although inflation—adjusted career—average DB plans would achieve
the same goal, in practice these plans are quite rare. In fact, the only
major DB plan that pays a benefit computed in such a fashion is the Social
Security system. We pursue this issue further in the analysis in Section IV.
G. Interest—Rate Risk
As noted earlier, one major source of uncertainty in DC plans concerns the
terms under which the stock of retirement wealth can be transformed into a
flow of retirement income. DB plans, by offering life annuities, effectively
guarantee the Interest rate at retirement. It should be noted, however, that
without indexation of benefits, this is a guarantee of the nominal rather than
the real interest rate. The value to the employee of a nominal—rate guarantee
is questionable when inflation over a 10 or 20 year period can be highly
unpredictable.
In principle, DC plans can offer at retirement the same nominal interest
rate guarantee through the purchase of deferred life annuities as a DB plan.
However, in practice, with the notable exception of the Teacher's Insurance
and Annuity Association (TIAA), the capitalization rates used to compute
benefits in the private annuity market are far below the interest rates
available in competitive financial markets. This discrepancy is often
attributed to an adverse selection problem, and discourages participation in
—13--the annuity market by unhealthy individuals.5 The adverse selection issue
is largely avoided in DB plans because workers are precorumitted to
participation regardless of health status.
IV.A MODEL OF WAGE AND INTEREST RATE UNCERTAINTY
In this section we develop a model to focus on the twin issues of wage and
interest—rateuncertainty using stylized versions of DB and DC plans. We find
thatthe putative replacement rate advantages of DB plans are not supportedby
ourmodel, and that the interest rate guarantee is only partially supported:
specifically,DB plans do offer welfare—improving opportunities with respect
to post—retirement interest—rate uncertainty, but not with respect to
preretirement uncertainty.
For the most part, we will concentrate on individual welfare in a model in
which all wage uncertainty is employee—specific, and, from the firm's
perspective, is perfectly diversifiable. This framework is at a polar extreme
from Merton's (1982) model of social security, in which all uncertainty
regarding marginal product derives from uncertainty in the aggregate
productionfunction, with no individual—specific effects. In Merton's
framework, labor—income uncertainty isperfectly correlated across
individuals,and in such an environment, DB plans may offersuperior
risk—sharing properties thatarenot captured in our model. Although our
model focuses exclusively on uncertainty at the individual worker's level and
interest—rate risk, we will discuss further the implications of Merton's model
for our results. As indicated earlier, interest—rate uncertaintyemerges as a
central determinant of the relative advantages of DB versus DC plans.
—14—A. Pension Plan Design
We consider a 3—period model in which the individual worksin periods 0
and 1 and is retired in period 2. Currentwage, W0 is known, while period 1
wage, W1, is uncertain until t =1.For simplicity, we will assume that the
time 0 expectation of W1 isW0. Trends in wage paths could easily be
incorporated into the analysis, and would simpiy clutter thealgebra; hence we
ignore such trends. Wages are measured in real dollars as of time 0.
Consumption occurs at three points: t0, 1, 2. A pension benefit, P,
Is paid at t2. The real interest rate prevailing between t =(0,1) is
denoted r0, and is known at time 0. The real rate betweent(1,2) is r1
and is not known until time 1. Finally, weassume that individuals have
Initial non—human wealth ofA0. The timing assumptions of the model are
presented in figure 1.
Figure 1: Timing Assumptions
0 1 2 Time
X——--————-—X----———---X
W0 W1 P Income
C0 C1 C2 Consumption
A0 A A2 Financial Wealth
——r0—— ——r1—— Interest Rate
—15—If financial markets were complete, then, of course, the choice of pension
plan would be irrelevant because the employee could trade to an optimal
position. There are two important deviations from complete markets that make
pension design crucial from the employee's perspective. First, there are
neither markets in which wage uncertainty can be insured, nor ones in which
claims to future wages can be sold. This feature of our model precludes
employee—initiated risk pooling. Second, because of adverse selection
problems, the market for deferred life annuities is assumed to be closed.
Although such markets do in fact exist, as discussed, the rates of return
typically offered are so low as to discourage widespread participation. In
our model, the absence of such annuities will be captured by not allowing
individuals to invest at t0 in two—period bonds which pay specified returns
during the retirement period, t=2.
The goal of the firm is to offer a pension plan that maximizes the utility
of a "typical" worker, subject to the constraint that all pension plans
considered have equal present value of costs to the firm. Subject to the
firm's Indifference condition, we compare the utility value of DB versus DC
plans.
In DB plans, firms typically promise workers a prespecified fraction of
career—end wages, possibly averaged over the last several years of working
life, and this is the type of plan we model. We will assume that the pension
benefit at t =2equals W1, 80 that expected income in each period of life
is equal. We assume further that pension benefits are explicitly linked to
the price level. While this practice is uncommon in the private sector in the
U.S., it is true of Social Security and it serves as a useful base case from
which to analyze the potential efficacy of competing pension designs.
—16—The present value at t =0of the firm's time—2 pension obligations is
PVDB =
E(W1)B(0,2) (1)
where B(0,2) is the present value at t0 of a claim to an expected payoff of
ftatt2, with uncertainty equivalent to that of the wage distribution. If
wage uncertainty were completely diversifiable, then B(0,2) would equal the
present value of a certain dollar to be received in two periods; B(t,T) would
be the discount function at t for payments at T. However, for themoment, we
will not restrict the nature of wage uncertainty.
In contrast to DB plans, DC plans require firms to contribute a
prespecified fraction of wages into the worker's retirement—savings account
each period. For simplicity we will assume that explicitwages paid in each
period are the same for each type of pension plan provided. Hence, the
Indifference condition for the firm is that the present value of periodic
contributions into the DC plan equals the present value of the DB commitment.
The prespecified (at t =0)DC contribution schedule is set at time 0 and
therefore can depend only on observed variables at t0. While the
contribution rates may depend on expectations of future interest rates, they
cannot be updated ex post to reflect realizations of interest rates or any
other factor.
There is an Infinite number of DC contribution schedules, which have the
same PV. Among these, we will select the one which has the same timing
pattern as the PV of accruing benefits under the DB plan.
The contribution schedule, kt, as a fraction of wages is given by:
—17—_lf\ = — -BkO,2) , t
(2)
k1 =-B(O,2)IB(O,l); t1







W0,the present values of the firm's contributions in the
DB and DC plans are equal.
Notice that since B(O,l) is less than one, the DC plan as specified above
embodies some backloading. In fact, any degree of prespecified backloading
may be built into the DC plan simply by changing the coefficients in (2) from
their values of ..Anycoefficient pair for k1 and k2 that sums to
one will ensure that the present value of the DC plan equals the present value
of the DB plan.
The pension benefit in the DC plan will accumulate at t=2 to a value that
depends on the investment experience of the plan. Call the rate of return on
the pension portfolio in each period and let Z = Thenthe
pension benefit paid at t=2 in the DC plan will be
DC B(O,2)W0Z0Z1 +[B(O,2)/B(O,l)]w1z1 (3)
whereas in the DB plan,
DB =l (4)
—18—Notice that there is no assurance, or even likelihood, that the expected
pension benefits will be equal across the two plans, despite the fact that the
ex ante present values are equal.
B.Welfare Analysis
Pension benefits are subject to uncertainty from both stochastic wage
paths and stochastic investment returns. Rather than consider these effects
jointly, we will examine polar cases in which one or the other source of
uncertainty dominates.
1.Wage Uncertainty
Consider first the case in which all investment returns can be made
certain by investing pension assets in risk—free bonds. Therefore both
r0
and r1 are known at t0. Moreover, suppose for the moment, that all wage
uncertainty is perfectly diversifiable to the firm, so that B(t,T) is simply
the discount function for riskiess future cash flows. Under these hypotheses,
Z0 =1+ r =
R0and Z1 =(1+r1)
=
Further,with no uncertainty regarding the evolution of future interest rates,
B(O,l) =hR0and B(O,2) =l/R0R1.Thus, (3) reduces to
P=1(w-4-w) (3') DC2 0 1
In this simple case, it is clear that the DC plan must dominate the DR plan
for any risk averse utility function. With E0(W1) =
W0,both pians have
—19—equal expected benefits, while the DC plan imposes less uncertainty on
participants because of the "wage averaging" embodied in (3'). Essentially
the only uncertainty in this case derives fromW1. The DC plan allows for
limited risk pooling of wage uncertainty through the firm (and ultimately the
stock market) while the DB plan allows for none. This advantage of DC plans
may be thought of as a pure efficiency gain.
The advantage of DC plans in the wage—uncertainty—only scenario does not
hinge solely on the diversifiability of wage risk. Suppose that finalwage is
highly correlated with some marketable security such as the value of the stock
of the firm, or the value of a broad market index. In thiscase, the DB plan
implicitly forces the participant to invest a large fraction of wealth in this
asset, since the pension benefit essentially duplicates the payoff to the
asset. In contrast, the DC plan allows the participant to take the pension
contribution each period and invest it in any security. Inessence, the DC
plan allows participants to get their money out of the (over)investment in
and achieve superior portfolio diversification. This advantage of DC
plans is incremental to the pure efficiency gain from the risk pooling
opportunity that was noted above.
2. Interest—Rate Uncertainty
In this section, we will assume that wage paths are either givenor
uncorrelated with the interest rate, and that the only investment vehiclesare
bonds. However the future path of interest rates is not known at the time the
pension contract is established. Because wages pose no systematic risk,
B(t,T) is simply the riskiess discount function, and B(O,l)
hR0.
As in Merton (1982), we will assume that the lifetime utility function for
the individual at time 0 is
—20—U0 =log(C0)+ E0[log(C1) + log(C2)] (5)
At time 1, all uncertainty is resolved since both W1 and (and hence P)
are known. Lifetime utility at t =1is thus
U1 =log(C1)+ log(C2)
and at t =2is
U2 =log(C2).
Upon arriving at t =2,the individual will consume all of his financial




Thus, at t =1,the optimization problem is
max[log(C1) + log(C2)]
which results in the first order condition
C1 —C2/R1
=0 (7)




Using the expressions for P from (3) and (4), we find that
c = +
W1 + W11R1)/2 (8—DB)
while
C =[A+ + (l/2)(w0 + w1Th(O,2)R0]/2 (8—Dc)
As expected, the difference between equations (8—Dc) and (8—DB) reflect
the wage diversification" attribute of DC plans, in that consumption depends
upon a weighted sum of earnings over the entire career. A perhaps surprising
feature of equations (8) is that consumption for individuals in DC plans is
not a function of the realized interest rate, R1, although it is for
—21—individuals in DB plans. This is true despite the fact that retirement wealth
Is subject to Interest rate risk for DC plans, but not for DB plans.
This feature of the model turns out to be an artifact of the logutility
function, but nevertheless highlights an important feature of DB versus DC
plan design. Recall the first order condition (7) for optimal consumption
allocation across times 1 and 2, which requires that time—2consumption be
times time—i consumption. For an individual in a DC plan, all wealth
already is held and canbeinvested at rate R1 at t =1.Thus,the simple
rule is to consume one half of wealth at t =1,invest the remainder, and thus
consume R1 times onehalfof wealth at t =2. Consumption at t =1is thus
Independent of R1. In contrast, in a DB plan, the pension benefit to be
received at t =2 already is fixed at t =1.Thus, a large value of
requires a decrease in t =1consumption in order to satisfy the first order
condition for an optimum. Another way of seeing this is tonote that, for the
log utility function, consumption at t1 depends only on wealth, not on the
interest rate. For DC plans, wealth at t =1Is independent of R1, since
all assets are already in hand. For DB plans,pension benefits are still
deferred at t =1,and wealth depends on
R,1.
For more general utility functions, consuniption at t =1depends on both
wealth and R1. However, DC plans still offera type of consumption
smoothing that is not offered by DB plans. Specifically, thegeneralized
first order condition at t =1 requires that the ratio of themarginal utility
of consumption at t1 to that at t =2equals R1. A larger R1 thus
induces more time—2 consumption. This can be attained withless (or no)
sacrifice of current consumption when assets arealready in hand since assets
currently invested can earn the higher rate of interest. In DBplans in
—22—contrast, there is no offset between income and substitution effects. A
larger R1 decreases pension wealth, and simultaneously requires a
reallocation of consumption to the retirement period, t=2. Thus, the
consumption stream in DC plans is less sensitive to the interest rate during
the accumulation phase, and indeed, in the log utility case, is actually
independent of the realization of the interest rate.
Using equations (8), we may now compute the derived or indirect utility
function at t 1.
JDB(A,Wl,tl)log(C1*) + log(C2*)
2 log[l/2(A1 + W1 + W1/R1)] + log(R1) (9—DB)
JDc(,Wl,t) =2log[l/2(A.1 + W1 + W'B(O,2)R0] + log(R1) (9—DC)
where W' =
(W0+ W1)/2, i.e., career—average earnings.
As a base case to compare (9—DB) and (9—DC), consider the situation in
which the expectations hypothesis for the term structure of interest rates
holds. Then B(O,2) =(l/R0)E0(l/R1).In this instance, with E0(W') =
andW1 uncorrelated with R1, the expectations of the arguments of
the log terms in (9) are equal. However, the argument of the log term in
(9—DC) is subject to less uncertainty (as of t'O) than in (9—DB). This is due
to both the wage diversification embodied in the DC plan, and the interest
rate risk that appears only in the DB plan.
Using equations (9), we may obtain the derived utility function at t0.
J(A0, W0, t0) max[log(C0) + E0 (J(A1, W1, tl))]
(10)
From (10), it is easy to show that time—0 utility is higher in the DC plan
(still assuming that the expectations hypothesis holds). Consider the
—23—optimizing value of time—O consumption under the DB plan. This consumption
choice is also feasible in the DC plan, and will result in an identical value
for A1. However, for any given A1, E0[J(A,1,W1,t1)] is greater in
the DC plan. This last point follows from the equal expected values of the
arguments of the log function in (9), the greater dispersion of the argument
in the DB plan, and the concavity of the log function. Because DC plans offer
greater welfare than DB plans at consumption levels that are optimal for DB
plans, they must do so a fortiori when C0 is chosen to be optimal for the DC
environment.
For the DB plan to dominate the DC plan, it would be necessary for it to
offer a greater expected pension benefit at t=2. This would require that
B(0,2) be less than E0(l/R0R1), that is, that there be a positive
liquidity or risk premium for investing in long—term bonds rather than rolling
over shorts.
At this point, it is worth reconsidering the assumptions of our model.
It should be apparent that the zero expected growth rate of real wages is not
essential to the argument. Our analysis would have been similar even with a
positive trend in real wages. The only major modification would involve an
adjustment for the fact that a DB plan with a 100 percent replacement rate of
final salary would promise retirement—period income greater than
career—average wages. The per period contributions to the retirement fund in
the equal present value DC plan would thus need to be correspondingly
increased. In the nomenclature of equation (2), the sum of k1 and k2
would need to exceed 1.0. However, aside from this adjustment, the analysis
would be similar.
The issue of interest rate uncertainty during the retirement period is
more difficult and poses issues not easily treated in the above model. In our
—24--3—period model, the individual simply consumes total retirement wealth in the
last period. If, however, retirement itself is viewed as a many—period
Interval, then real retirement income and not wealth may be the significant
determinant of welfare. Given a stock of wealth at retirement, the real
consumption stream that Is feasible for the retiree depends upon the real
long—term interest rate at the time of retirement, when the purchase of a
(real) life annuity is contemplated. Even if retirement wealth can be
predicted fairly precisely with a low—investment—risk DC retirement fund, the
real income stream that can be generated by that wealth is subject to
considerable uncertainty.6 In contrast, by guaranteeing a specified income
(and hence, consumption) stream upon retirement, the (price—level indexed) DB
plan eliminates the risk associated with the conversion, at retirement, of a
stock of retirement wealth into a flow of equivalent—present—value
consumption. DC plans cannot offer a guaranteed capitalization rate at
retirement because of our assumption that life annuities and bonds of
long—enough maturity do not exist.
In order to examine some potential effects of uncertainty in the interest
rate at retirement, we will consider a simple adjustment to our model.
Suppose that at t=2, the financial assets of individuals are multiplied by
some increasing function of R2, f(R2), where R2 equals one plus the
post—retirement rate of interest. The multiplication by f(R2) reflects the
increased retirement—income stream that is available to DC participants when
interest rates at retirement turn out to be high. In contrast, for DB plans,
the retirement—income stream is guaranteed by the firm so that Interest—rate
risk is not borne by plan participants.
Reconsider now the optimal consumption program for DC plan participants.
—25—At t=2,
C2 =[A+ w1 —
C1)R1 + PDcJf(R2) (10)
which now is stochastic at tl because of the dependence onR2. Thus, at
t1, the maximization problem becomes
maxlog(C1)+ E1[log(C2)]





But examination of (10) and (11) shows thatf(R2) drops out of the first
order conditions so that (11) results in exactly the sameconsumption level at
t =1as in the nonstochastic model. Lifetime utility, however, may
change. For example, for an actuarially fairf(R2) adjustment, such as
f(R2) =R2/E1(R2),7consumption at t =1is unchanged, while
consumption at t =2has the same expected value as in the previous model, but
greater uncertainty. In this case, expected time—2 utility falls. If time—2
interest rate uncertainty is sufficiently great relative towage and time—l
interestrate uncertainty, DCplans could become inferior to DB plans from the
viewpointof plan participants.Thus, retirement—period interestrate
uncertainty emerges as a potential advantage of DB relativeto DC plans.
C.Factor—ShareUncertainty
Mertori (1982)hasexamined a model inwhichlabor—income
uncertaintyderivesentirely from an aggregate productionfunction in which
incomeshares accruing to capitalandlabor are stochastically determined. In
contrast tothe model above in whichlabor income uncertainty is
—26—diversifiable, in Merton's model, labor income is perfectly correlated across
individuals. Given the nontradeability of human capital, economic
inefficiencies arise in this economy, since early in life, individuals hold
too much of their wealth in human capital relative to physical capital, while
at retirement all wealth is invested in physical capital. These portfolio
imbalances preclude optimal sharing of factor—share risk. Merton suggests
that a Social Security system which pays retirees a share of current wage
income implicitly provides diversification across factor shares, and can
increase welfare by improving the efficiency of risk—bearing in the economy.
A similar argument can be made with regard to DB versus DC plans. In a DC
plan, the income of a retired individual depends solely on investment
performance, and is independent of retirement—period uncertainty in factor
shares. Retirees thus have no stake in labor income during their retirement
period. In a DB plan, retirement income is also determined upon retirement.
However,if factor share uncertainty is primarily attributable to
unforeseeable long—term secular trends (rather than to transitory business
cycleeffects) then a final—salary DB plan mayprovide risk—sharing benefits
similarto Merton's Social Security scheme. Such secular uncertainty could
arise, for example, from unanticipated changes in labor—augmenting technical
progress.
Since the pension benefit under the DB plan is tied to final salary,
individuals participating in such a scheme are invested in an implicit
security that is tied to the wage share in the neighborhood of the retirement
period. To the extent that firms offer ad hoc increases in pension benefits
when wages of current employees increase, the retiree's stake in aggregate
labor income is further enhanced. Of course DC plan benefits also depend to
—27—some extent on end—of—career earnings. However, the career averaging
properties of DC plans greatly reduce the magnitude of this dependence. Thus,
if labor—income uncertainty is predominantly dependent on economy—wide
factors, then this source of risk will favor DB over DC plans.
D.Inflation
In the preceding model, we assumed that wages and pension benefitswere
all contracted in real terms. It is clear thatthevast majority of DB plans
as currently implemented are not contractually indexed during the retirement
period. This weakens the case for viewing DB plans as offering
income—maintenance or interest—rate insurance.
Moreover, there is controversy surrounding the degree of indexation during
the worker's active life. Bulow (1982) has argued thatwages in firms
administering DB plans should not be expected to keep pacewiththe price
level. His argument is based on the notion that labor markets clearas spot
markets (with respect to pension issues) and thatany implicit contracts
between firms and workers are independent of pension issues. In thiscase,
the market clearing employee compensation will determine thesum of wages plus
accruing pension benefits. The level of either wages or pension accruals
alone, however, is indeterminate.
To illustrate Bulow's point consider the effects of anunanticipated
increase in the price level. The increase imposes a real losson workers,
since their pension benefits are defined in nominal terms. Ofcourse, the
worker's loss is the firm's gain. If, however, the employeeswere to receive
a pay raise in the subsequent period which would keep their realwage
constant, then the earnings base upon which pension benefits are calculated
—28—also would rise at the inflation rate, and the worker's pension loss would be
eliminated. Real compensation in the second period would in effect be higher
than in the first: real wages are constant, but pension transfers have
increased in order to compensate for the effects of the unanticipated
Inflation. The firm has, in effect, issued insurance against the effect of
inflation on the value of pension benefits.
Bulow argues that firms should not be expected to and do not behave in
this way. His competing model holds total real compensation exogenous.
Because pension benefits in DB plans Increase with the wage level, the wage
component of compensation will not rise at the Inflation rate in the
subsequent period. Instead, the sum of the partially indexed wage increase
and partially indexed recovery of real pension benefits together will provide
an Increase in nominal compensation which matches the inflation rate.
However, the Initial loss of pension value due to the inflation is borne
entirely by the worker.
Under the Bulow model, DB plans pose significant risk to participants.
The nominal nature of the pension contract is to be taken quite seriously;
workers bear the entire brunt of inflation risk. Thus, while DB plans provide
a less variable final—salary replacement rate to workers than do DC plans, the
final real salary itself becomes more sensitive to inflation. Whether DB or
DC plans are riskier in a utility sense is therefore an open question.
Bulow's model is far from universally accepted. Several observers (e.g.
Cohn and Modigllani [1983]) believe thatfirmsdo in fact offer implicit
indexation to workers. In this view, the wage decision is made separately
from the pension decIsion, and the effects of wage increases on pension
benefits are ignored in the determination of worker compensation.
—29—V. CONCLUDING COMMENTS: IS THERE A BETTER WAY?
Themajor advantage of DB plans is the potential they offer to provide a
stable replacement rate of final income to workers. If the replacementrate
is the relevant variable for worker retirement utility, then DBplans offer
some degree of insurance against real wage risk. Of course, protection
offered to workers is risk borne by the firm. As realwages change, funding
rates must correspondingly adjust. However, to the extent that realwage risk
is largely diversiflable to employers, and nondiversifiableto employees, the
replacement rate stability should be viewed as an advantage of DBplans.
The advantages of DC plans are most apparent duringperiods of inflation
uncertainty. These are: the predictability of the value of pension wealth,
the ability to invest in inflation—hedged portfolios ratherthan nominal DB
annuities, and the fully—funded nature of the DC plan. Finally, the DCplan
has the advantage that workers can more easily determine thetrue present
value of the pension benefit they earn inany year, although they may have
more uncertainty about future pension benefit flows at retirement.Measuring
the present value of accruing defined benefits is difficultat best and
imposes severe informational requirements on workers. Such difficultiescould
lead workers to misvalue their totalcompensation, and result in misinformed
8 behavior.
Of interest for future research is thepossibility of pension plan designs
that combine the best attributes of DB and DCplans. Many firms already offer
DB plans supplemented by DC plans. Aninteresting alternative is the
so—called floor plan, which is in essence a DC plantogether with a guarantee
of a minimum retirement income based ona DB—type formula.9 Enployers and
employees can trade off the level of guaranteed flooragainst the size of the
—30—expected DC benefit. These plans offer the downside protection of DB plans,
yet still allow employees to take positions in high expected return assets.
Floor plans already are offered by some firms and allow for a great deal of
flexibility and creativity.
—31—Footnotes
1.It is important to distinguish here between severalsubcategories of DC
plans: money purchase, profit sharing and thrift plans. Formoney
purchase plans like TIAA—cREF, contributions are usually basedon the
employee's compensation as stated in the text. But in profitsharing
plans employer contributions are based on the sponsor'sprofitability, and
inthrift planscontributionlevels are usually determined voluntarily by
employees, with employer matching contributions at someprespecified
rate. Thrift plans are usuallyoffered as a supplement to a DB or other
DCplan.
2.Until the late l970s, employee contributions tomany DC plans were not
tax—deductible, the main exception being employees of certainnon—profit
organizations(403(b) plans). But recently the government hasexpanded
tax—deductibility of employee contributions to the privatefor—profit
sector through 401(k) plans.
3. There is a separate question of whether thedifference in backloadirig
patterns isof importance to workers. Consider a scenario inwhich the
inflation rate is fixed and only the interestrate varies. In this case,
the impact of interest rates on accrualpatterns would be irrelevant to
workers from a welfare standpoint. The realstream of benefits to be paid
starting at retirement is independent of the trajectory of thepresent
value of accrued benefits. When inflation ratesare stochastic, however,
backloading patterns can have important effects on welfare. Thereal
benefit stream during retirement movesinversely with the stochastic price
level.
—32—4. The contribution pattern for a DC plan required to match the accrual
pattern of a DB plan could runintoIRS limits on annual contributions at
older ages, particularly for higher paid employees.
5. An alternative explanation is that insurance companies view their
annuitants as members of a captive market and try to recoup past losses by
offering them below—market rates.
6. As always, it is impossible to tell from first principles of welfare
analysis whether an individual would necessarily choose to convert wealth
into a riskiess stream of retirement benefits.
7. This is an actuarially fair adjustment in the sense that the expected
value of period—3 income would be unaffected.
8. While workers are more likely to be informationally disadvantaged than
employers, the level of complication is such that employers also may make
significant mistakes. Allofthis is perhaps an issue in evaluating the
Bulow argument since that argument turns on accurate perceptions of the
"true" pension benefits andcosts.
9. Among the companies offering floor plans are Xerox, Hewlett—Packard, and
Georgia—Pacific.
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